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and described this procedure in Kermarec v. Compagnie General
Transatlantique,3 where it pointed out that,
the common law courts have found it necessary to formulate increasingly subtle verbal refinements, to create subclassifications among traditional common law categories, and to delieneate fine gradations in the
standards of care which the landowner owes to each. Yet, even in a
single jurisdiction, the classifications bred by the common law have
produced confusion and conflict. As new distinctions have become
spawned, older ones have become obscurred. Through this semantic
morass the common law has moved, unevenly and with hesitation,
towards imposing on owners and occupiers a single duty of reasonable
care in all circumstances.

DICK STEINCIPHER

Recovery for Suicide-Wrongful Death. The Washington Supreme
Court, by a 5-to-4 decision in Orcutt v. Spokane County,1 made possible
recovery by wrongful death action for negligent conduct resulting in
suicide.
The plaintiff's decedent, while riding in a car driven by the defendant, received severe injuries which allegedly resulted in her suicide one
year and nine months later. The administratrix of the deceased
brought an action for pain and suffering, medical and hospital expenses,
and wrongful death. Damages were allowed for pain and suffering and
for medical and hospital expenses under RCW 4.20.060 (thus presenting an interesting example of survival of damages for pain and suffering,
in Washington possible only in a wrongful death action). 2
On the wrongful death issue, the court held that where there is medical testimony concluding that the suicide was the immediate result of
an uncontrollable impulse ultimately caused by the defendant's negligence, the issue of proximate cause is for the jury's determination.
Since the Washington court is one of the few to grant recovery for
suicidal death, a review of the legal developments in this area seems in
order. Starting with the basic proposition that a defendant's conduct
must have proximately caused an injury in order to make him liable,'
the general rule in the majority of suicide-wrongful death cases has
been to deny recovery.' Two theories support this result: (1) death by
suicide cannot logically be regarded as the natural and probable conse33358

U.S. 625, 631 (1961).

1158 Wash. Dec. 842, 364 P2d 1102 (1961).
236 WAsH. L. REv. 331 (1961).

3 GRN, PROXIMATE

CAUSE 132
4 11 A.L.PR2d 751, 757 (1950).

(1927).
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quence of such conduct' (2) the suicide's acts are an independent force
which breaks the chain of causation.' A single exception to the general
rule has been developed, however, on the theory that if defendant's
conduct caused decedent to become insane, then decedent's involuntary
act of suicide while insane would be a normal incident of the risk and
could not be considered an intervening force. The key problem in the
cases recognizing the exception has thus been to establish standards by
which to judge the degree or type of insanity which will make a decedent's suicide an involuntary act.
LIABILITY ARsING FRom NEGLIGENT INJURY

Where defendant's conduct in causing the insanity has been negligent, three standards have been developed. Liability will be extended
where the death of the injured person results from his own act: (1)
committed in a delirium or frenzy without understanding the nature
and consequences of his act,' (2) committed in a delirium or frenzy
without conscious volition to produce death, but with knowledge of the
physical nature and consequences of his act,8 (3) committed with
knowledge of the nature and consequences of the act, but under an
uncontrollable or insane impulse, which is irresistible because insanity

prevents his reason from controlling his actions.'
Although quite authoritatively stated in the Orcutt opinion, the uncontrollable impulse rule has been successfully applied in favor of a
plaintiff in only two other cases during the sixty years of its existence. 10
Of the eleven 1 American negligence cases, only four have denied recovery without discussing uncontrollable impulse. 2 Five have stated the
GScheffer v. Washington City, V.M. & G.S. R.R. Co., 105 U.S. 249 (1882).
6Koch v. Fox, 71 App. Div. 288, 75 N.Y. S. 913 (1902), later Koch v. Zimmerman,
85 App. Div. 370, 83 N.Y.S. 339 (1903) ; Daniels v. N.Y.N.H. & H. RHR., 183 Mass.
393, 67 N.E. 424 (1903); Brown v. Am. Steel & Wire Co., 43 Ind. App. 560, 88 N.E. 80
(1909) ; Long v. Omaha & C.B. St. Ry., 108 Neb. 342, 187 N.W. 930 (1922) ; Arsnow v.
Red Top Cab Co., 159 Wash. 137, 292 Pac. 436 (1930).
7Koch v. Fox, 71 App. Div. 288, 75 N.Y.S. 913 (1902), later Koch v. Zimmerman,
85 App. Div. 370, 83 N.Y.S. 339 (1903) ; Arsnow v. Red Top Cab Co., 159 Wash. 137,
2928 Pac. 436 (1930).
Daniels v. N.Y.N.H.& H. R.R., 183 Mass.393, 67 N.E.424 (1903).
0 Scheffer v. Washington City, V.M. & G.S. R.R. Co., 105 U.S. 249 (1882) ; Lum v.
Fullaway, 42 Hawaii 500, 3 D.C.H. 58 (1958) ; Tate v. Canonica, 180 Cal. App. 2d 898,
5 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1960).
10 Lum v. Fullaway, 42 Hawaii 500, 3 D.C.H. 58 (1958) ; Tate v. Canonica, 180 Cal.
App. 2d 898, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1960).
11 A twelfth case, Millman v. United States Mortgage & T.G. Co., 121 N.J.L. 28, 1
A.2d 265 (1938), involved an attempted suicide.
12 Scheffer v. Washington City, V.M. & G.S. R.R. Co., 105 U.S. 249 (1882), see
discussion preceding note 4; Ludlow v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R. Co., 144 La. 307, 80 So. 547
(1919) (without discussion other than to say that decedent had the purpose of suicide in
mind); Brenner v. Public Serv. Prod. Co., 110 NJ.L. 344, 164 Atl. 454 (1933) (no
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rule as dicta but then refused to apply it in favor of the particular
plaintiffs, mainly because in each case the plaintiff had failed to produce
or allege enough facts to show uncontrollable impulse, but also because
the physical acts of the decedents preparatory to suicide had indicated
an intelligent purpose to commit suicide. 3 Without mention of uncontrollable impulse, one case made recovery possible on the basic theory
behind the rule itself, that since the decedent was insane, his act was
not voluntary and did not break the causal connection between tort
and death." Finally, in Lum v. Fullaway, the Supreme Court of
Hawaii denied a motion to dismiss a complaint which alleged that
decedent was "bereft of reason and while in this condition took her own
life, being motivated by an uncontrollable impulse."' 5 Ruling that the
issue thus presented must be decided as a matter of proof, the court
followed the opinion in Elliot v. Stone Baking Co.,'" and dicta in five
other cases.' Aside from Orcutt, the most recent American case is
Tate v. Canonica, in which both intentional and negligent acts were
alleged. The court adopted the uncontrollable impulse rule with regard
to the allegation of negligence, and rested its decision on: (1) the position adopted by the American Law Institute in the Restatement of
Torts, 9 (2) Prosser," (3) the reasoning in Elliot"' and (4) Cauverien
v. De Metz.2 2 In Tate the court emphasized that even if decedent knew
what he was doing and knew the nature and consequences of his acts,
the suicide would not be an independent cause where decedent was
unable to resist the impulse to kill himself. By taking this position the
court has weakened the effect of evidence concerning the decedent's
preparations for suicide.
proof that death couldn't have happened from a cause unconnected with the defendant);
McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc. 2d 143, 141 N.Y.S2d 190, aff'd, 3 App. Div.
713, 159 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1955), where evidence showed that decedent was a sane, depressed
man, a claim of death springing from a depression psychosis was not sufficient.
3
Scheffer v. Washington City, V.M. & G.S.R.R. Co., 105 U.S. 249 (1882).
14 Elliot v. Stone Baking Co., 49 Ga. 515, 176 S.E. 112 (1934). A demurrer was
overruled on the basis of cases holding (1) that a causal connection was not broken if
the intervening act was such that its probable or natural consequence could reasonably
have been anticipated, apprehended or foreseen, (2) that if a bullet wound inflicted by
defendant on X contributed concurrently with a knife wound (later inflicted by X on
himself) in causing X's death, then defendant is guilty of homicide, and (3) that if
parole of a mental patient from a hospital was negligent, then a causal relation existed
between the parole and a fire set while insane.
'. 42 Hawaii 500, 512, 3 D.C.H. 58 (1958).
16 49 Ga. 515, 176 S.E. 112 (1934).
17 Scheffer v. Washington City, V.M. & G.S. R.R. Co., 105 U.S. 249 (1882).
"1180 Cal. App. 2d 898, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1960).
19 RESTATEMENT, ToRTs, § 455 (1934).
20 PRossER, TORTS, § 49 at 273 (2d ed. 1955).
21 Supra note 16.
22 20 Misc. 2d 144, 188 N.Y.S2d 627 (1959).

19621

WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1961

Legal writers23 and most of the courts which recognize the uncon-

trollable impulse rule ultimately rely on dicta in Koch v. Fox " and/or
Daniels v. N.Y.N.H. & H. .R?.
These two cases appropriated the
rule from a series of insurance cases where beneficiaries were allowed
to recover under life insurance policies which contained clauses exempt-

ing coverage if death occurred by suicide.26 Although recognizing that
insurance cases involved interpretation of insurance contract terms,

while wrongful death cases involved proximate cause and interpretation
of wrongful death statutes, the courts in Koch and Daniels decided that

the conclusions reached in the insurance cases were also applicable to
the suicide-wrongful death field.
Two basic theories were advanced by plaintiff in the English decision
of Borradailev. Hunter:17 first, because of insanity the suicide was not

the act of the insured at all, and second, since only criminal acts of selfdestruction were contemplated in the contract, a party who was insane
by criminal standards had not committed suicide according to the un-

derstanding of the parties. An American court in the early case of
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Terry"8 seemed to base its decision more on
considerations of policy. Noting that the question of sanity may avoid
the validity of an agreement, the capacity to make a will, or responsi-

bility for a crime, the court stated that "a similar principle must control
the present case, although the standard may be different." 9
LIABILITY BASED ON INTENTIONAL INJURY

Where defendant's conduct in causing the insanity has been intentional, there has been little uniformity in developing standards from
which to determine liability. Of the six American intent cases, the first
four followed the general rule denying recovery. 0 Then, in Cauverien
22 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 455 (1934) ; PROSSER, TORTS, § 49 at 273 (2d ed. 1955).
2471 App. Div. 288, 75 N.Y.S. 913 (1902), later Koch v. Zimmerman, 85 App. Div.
370, 83 N.Y.S. 339 (1903).
5183 Mass. 393, 67 N.E. 424 (1903).
2
6Koch cited: Van Zandt v. Mutual Benefit Ins. Co., 55 N.Y. 169, 14 Am. Rep. 215
(1873); Newton v. Mutual Benefit Ins. Co., 76 N.Y. 426, 32 Am. Rep. 335 (1879);
Meacham v. Association, 120 N.Y. 237, 24 N.E. 283 (1890). Daniels cited: Dean v.
Am. Ins. Co., 84 Mass. (4 Allen) 96 (1862) ; Cooper v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 102
Mass. 227, 3 Am. Rep. 451 (1869) ; Boradaile v. Hunter, 5 M. & G. 637, 44 Eng. Rep.
335 (C.P. 1843) ;Clift v. Schwabe, 3 M., G. & S. 437, 54 Eng. Rep. 437 (Ex.1846).
27 5 M. & G. 639, 44 Eng. Rep. 335 (C.P. 1843).
23 82 U.S. (15 Wall) 236 (1873).
25 Id. at 242.
30 Stevens v. Steadman, 140 Ga. 680, 79 S.E. 564 (1913), it was held impossible to
say that any particular state of mind would naturally result from a letter asking for a
resignation; Salsedo v. Palmer, 278 Fed. 92 (2d Cir. 1921), based on Scheffer, Stevens
and Daniels; Waas v. Ashland Day & Night Bank, 201 Ky. 469, 257 S.W. 29 (1923),
based on Scheffer, Stevens and Salsedo (attempted suicide); Jones v. Stewart, 183
Tenn. 176, 191 S.W.2d 439 (1946), based on Stevens, Salsedo and Daniels.
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v. De Metz,"' the New York court adopted the uncontrollable impulse
rule and other views expressed by the dissent in the earlier case of
Salsedo v. Palmer 2 because "the trend merging from the cases in tort
liability since that time as well as the advances in medical science and
knowledge of mental illness compel... [that] conclusion."33 In addition, the court felt that the rule was a more realistic approach to the
problem, and accepted the reasoning of both the Restatement of Torts3
and Prosser. 5 Going further, the court considered the element of intent
as a factor in determinations of liability. The court said that when a
wrong is alleged to be intentional, the wrongdoer is responsible for
injuries directly caused (even though beyond the limits of foreseeability) and the question of proximate cause is for the jury.
3" the California
In the most recent intent case, Tate v. Canonica,
court stated that: defendants would only be liable if (a) they intentionally caused severe physical or mental distress to decedent, and (b)
that physical or mental distress was severe enough to be, in the judgment of the trier of fact, a substantial factor in bring about the suicide."
This standard was based on the Restatement of Torts38 and also on the
theory that intervening cause has no application to the law of intentional torts so long as there is a factual chain of causation. The court
went much further than in the Cauverien decision in holding that even
a "voluntary" suicide would not make it an independent intervening
cause.
OTHER SUICIDE CASES

Public policy considerations have controlled determinations of liability in other suicide situations:
(1) Following a policy of liberal statutory construction, workmen's
compensation cases since 1915 have uniformly granted recovery for
suicidal death due to uncontrollable impulse resulting from insanity
caused by injury in the course of employment.3
3120 Misc. 2d 144, 188 N.Y.S2d 627 (1959).
32278 Fed. 92 (2d Cir. 1921).
33
Cauverien v. De Metz, 20 Misc. 2d 144, 188 N.Y.S.2d 627, 632 (1959). See case
cited
note 8 supra.
34
RESTATEmENT, TORTS, § 455 (1934).
35 PROSSER, TORTS, op. cit. supra note 20.
180 Cal. App. 2d 898, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1960).
386
3
7Id. at 38.
38
RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 279, Comment c, § 280 (1934).
39 In re Sponatski, 220 Mass. 526, 108 N.E. 466 (1915) ; Lupfer v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 269 Pa. 275, 112 Ati. 458 (1921) ; Wilder v. Russell Library Co., 107
Conn. 56, 139 Atl. 644 (1927) ; Delinousha v. National Biscuit Co., 248 N.Y. 93, 161
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(2) Recovery has also been allowed where defendant was found to
have breached a specific duty of care toward decedent. Most cases in
this area have arisen where a hospital or sanitarium is found to owe the
specific duty of exercising such reasonable care and attention for the
safety of its patients as their mental and physical condition, if known,
may require."
(3) Civil damage acts or "dramshop acts" have been passed in some
states allowing recovery where defendant caused decedent to become
intoxicated, and which intoxication caused suicide."
(4) As a general rule druggists are not civilly liable for negligence
in selling a dangerous product which is eventually used to commit
42
suicide.
(5) A conviction of murder was affirmed where a girl committed
suicide after an attempted rape.4 8 Defendant's heinous conduct obviously needed redress.
THE ORCUTT DECISION

Having reviewed the development of the uncontrollable impulse rule
and the general area of liability following a suicide, the Orcutt case may
be more readily appreciated as a liberal extension of liability for negligently caused harm.
In the Orcutt decision the Washington court relied upon the uncontrollable impulse rule as stated in the 1930 Washington case of Arsnow
v. Red Top Cab Co.,"4 remarking that "it is in conformity with the rule
as expressed by many text writers, and it reflects the weight of case law
in other jurisdictions."" The Arsnow case was based on the Daniels
rationale,46 and similarly denied recovery because the plaintiff failed to
produce evidence to support a theory of uncontrollable impulse. The
only basis for distinguishing Orcutt from Arsnow is the presence of
N.E. 431 (1928) ; Jackson Hill Coal & Coke Co. v. Slover, 102 Ind. App. 145,
417 (1936) ; Karlen v. Department of Labor & Indus., 41 Wash2d 301, 249
(1952) ; Gatterdam v. Department of Labor & Indus., 185 Wash. 628, 56
(1936) ; McFarland v. Department of Labor & Indus., 188 Wash. 357, 62
(1936).
40 11 A.L.R.2d 751, 778 (1950) ; Kent v. Whitaker, 364 P.2d 556 (1961).

199 N.E.
P2d 364
P.2d 693
P.2d 714
See also

Bogust v. Iverson, 10 Wis.2d. 129, 102 N.W.2d 228 (1960), where college counsellor
was held to have no duty to prevent suicide in absence of facts showing that he should
have known of student's suicidal tendencies and of facts showing loss of volition.
4111 A.L.R.2d 751, 766 (1950).
42 Id. at 763.
43 Stephenson v. State, 205 Ind. 141, 179 N.E. 633 (1932).
44
Scheffer v. Washington City, V.M. & G.S. R.. Co., 105 U.S. 249 (1882).
45 158 Wash. Dec. 842, 364 P.2d 1102 (1961).
40 183 Mass. 393, 67 N.E. 424, (1903), see text discussion accompanying note 24.
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medical testimony establishing that the injury caused a mental condition which resulted in an uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide. All
the cases which have considered the uncontrollable impulse rule and
which then have denied recovery have done so because the facts failed
to support the requirements of the rule. 7 Long v. Omaha & C.B. St.
Ry. was the only one of these cases to decide the question on demurrer,
however, and in that case the plaintiff alleged that he had experts ready
to show that the suicide resulted from the injury. Orcutt seems, therefore, directly inconsistent with Long, but the Long case was not even
discussed.
Expert testimony in Daniels (that decedent was probably insane
when he took his life) and in Koch (that the injuries would tend to
cause him to have impulses of an abnormal nature, to be irritable, melancholy, and irrational ... and that the injuries were considered ample
to cause his death) were similarly not discussed or distinguished in the
Orcutt opinion.
Evidently the Washington court was more willing to rely on general
statements of the rule in the Restatement of Torts4 8 and Prosser49 and
on the trend toward recovery evidenced by Tate, than on the three
earlier decisions. An additional make-weight was found in a rather
weak analogy to workmen's compensation cases adopting uncontrollable impulse." Whatever the rationale, however, it now appears that
medical testimony is a quick and easy route to the jury.
Although some psychiatrists deny that suicide is ever committed with
a sound mind, the courts, in adopting "degree of volition" of decedent's
act as the criterion for liability, have assumed that it is possible to
commit suicide voluntarily. 1 In order to determine liability, therefore,
it has become necessary for the courts to judge what has been going on
in the mind of a suicide. Obviously this is an impossible task, and the
courts have recognized that fact by making their determinations on the
basis of other factors. Decisions have turned on: (1) physical preparations for suicide tending to show an understanding of the physical
nature and effect of the act and an intelligent purpose to accomplish
it 52 (2) facts of the method of suicide as showing knowledge of the
47 See cases cited supra note 6.
455 (1934).
273 (2d ed. 1955).
Karlen v. Department of Labor & Indus., 41 Wash.2d 301, 249 P.2d 362 (1952) ;
Gatterdam v. Department of Labor & Indus., 185 Wash. 628, 56 P.2d 693 (1936) ;
McFarland v. Department of Labor & Indus., 188 Wash. 357, 62 P.2d 714 (1936).
51 See generally 15 RUTGERS L. REv. 134 (1960).
52Daniels,Brown, Long, Armow.
48 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §
49
50 PROSSER, TORTS, § 49 at
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means and purpose of destroying life,"3 (3) the harmless nature of
defendant's conduct which produced no physical impact," (4) whether
defendant's conduct was intended to harm, and (5) the presence of
expert testimony."
Whether the determination is made in terms of proximate cause or
foreseeable risk, and no matter which of the five factors above are considered by the courts, public policy and common sense would indicate
that each case should be decided only after a complete hearing of the
evidence. The Orcutt decision seems clearly in line with the trend of
the times in delaying policy considerations until after a jury has found

negligence.

HARTLEY PAUL

Tavemkeeper's Liability for Act of Guest. In Miller v. Staton,' the
members of the Washington Supreme Court disagree on how properly
to apply the general rule that a tavernkeeper "owes the duty to his
guests to exercise reasonable care to protect them from injury at the
2
hands of a fellow guest."
At about ten o'clock New Year's Eve, 1957, the plaintiff and her
husband went to the defendants' tavern in Omak, Washington. At
2:20 in the morning the plaintiff, while drinking beer at a table next to
the dance area, was knocked to the floor and injured during a fight
between two intoxicated patrons. Earlier in the evening two fights had
been prevented by the defendants' employees.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were negligent in failing to
provide sufficient policing to prevent the fight, and was awarded a
$25,743.37 verdict by the jury. The cause was reversed and remanded
for prejudicial error in admitting testimony concerning policing practices of another establishment and certain irrelevant medical bills.'
However, a majority of the court held there was sufficient evidence in
support of the plaintiff's allegations to attach liability for negligence.
It is the latter point that results in a sharp disagreement between the
majority and dissent. That the tavernkeepers' liability is to be based
53

Brown, Long, Arsnow.
6, Stevens, Jones.
Cauverien, Tate.
Vc Orcut.
55

1158 Wash. Dec. 874, 365 P2d 333 (1961).

2
Peck v. Gerber, 154 Ore. 126, 54 P2d 675 (1936) ; Thomas v. Bruza, 151 Cal.
App2d 150, 311 P.2d 128 (1957) ; Fisher v. Robbins, 78 Wyo. 50, 319 P.2d 116 (1957);
106 A.L.R. 1003; RESTATESIENT, TORTS § 348 (1934).
3 Miller v. Staton, 158 Wash. Dec. 874, 879, 365 P2d 333, 336 (1961).

